Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on identification schemes is one of the main ways of constructing signature schemes. While the classical security of this transformation is well understood, it is only very recently that generic results for the quantum case has been proposed [DFMS19, LZ19] . In this paper, we show that if we start from a commit-and-open identification scheme, where the prover first commits to several strings and then as a second message opens a subset of them depending on the verifier's message, then the Fiat-Shamir transform is quantum secure, for a suitable choice of commitment scheme. Unlike previous generic results, our transformation doesn't require to reprogram the random function H used in the Fiat-Shamir transform and we actually only require a quantum one-wayness property.
Introduction
There has been a strong interest in post-quantum cryptography in the last years. While we are still very far from having a full quantum computer, there are important technological advances each year and it is still very possible that future quantum computers will be powerful enough to run Shor's algorithm [Sho94] or other quantum algorithms devastating for current cryptography.
Post-quantum cryptosystems are based on computational problems which are not known to be broken by quantum computers like problems based on lattices, multivariate polynomials, isogenies or error correcting codes; and there is currently a standardization process of post-quantum cryptosystems organized by the NIST [Nis17] . Quite surprisingly, while all the proposals are based on problems believed to be hard for quantum computers, many of the submissions, even the round 2 submissions, do not have a proper security proof against quantum computers. This is specially true for signature schemes where about half of the round 2 submissions do not have an explicit quantum security proof, even if the recent results of [DFMS19, LZ19] are quickly solving this problem. This shows how hard these quantum security proofs can be.
3. Our first contribution requires to use as a commitment a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l for some l. This can make the signature scheme very inefficient. We show how to circumvent this inefficiency by using random sponges which will make the commitments much smaller and the scheme much more efficient.
In order to prove our results, we use the following strategy:
• We generalize the result in [Unr17] and show that we can prove quantum security for an identification scheme with computational-statistical-soundness and not statistical soundness.
The notion of computational-statistical-soundness captures security against a prover who is computationally limited when sending the first message but with unbounded power when sending the second message.
• We show that any commit-and-open identification scheme that uses as a commitment a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l indeed has computational-statistical-soundness. This also gives the strict soundness property to our scheme, which is known to be necessary [ARU14] .
• For our second contribution on existing schemes, we actually use Zhandry's framework on how to record quantum queries. This will allow to remove the quadratic loss that comes from one of the steps of our proof (Proposition 3). From a technical standpoint, we generalize a result of Zhandry that relates the contents of his compressed oracle and of his standard oracle.
Organization of the paper
In Section 3, we present different definitions for identification schemes and signature schemes. In Section 4, we show our results on generic commit-and-open identification schemes. In Section 5, we show how to make this security much tighter when considering identification schemes which are a parallel repetition of commit-and-open schemes of challenge size 3. In Section 7, we show how to instantiate the commitments we require with a random sponge while preserving efficient communication.
Preliminaries

Quantum query algorithms and the quantum random oracle model
For any quantum algorithm A , we denote by |A | it's total running time. We will also consider query algorithms A O that will make a certain amount of calls to an oracle O. The Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is a model where we model a certain function with a random function H. Since we are in the quantum setting, we have a black box access to H but also to the unitary O H (|x |y ) = |x |H(x) + y . Zhandry presented in [Zha18] an alternative way at looking at the QROM that we present in Section 6.
Quantum lower bounds
The study of quantum security in the QROM involves several quantum query lower bounds. We present here those that will be used in this paper. Throughout the paper, x $ ← − S means that x is chosen uniformly at random from S. Lemma 1 ([Zha15] ). For any quantum query algorithm A O makingueries to O, we have
where F Y X is the set of functions from X to Y and F Y X (r) is the set of functions f from X to Y such that |Im(f )| = r.
Another useful quantum lower bound is a generalization of Grover's lower bound.
The above lemma was implicitly stated and proven in [Unr17, Theorem21] . The idea is to construct a function H 2 (x) = H(x) + u(x) where u(x) is a random element from U x and use standard lower bounds for Grover search on random functions. It is also possible to directly use the recent framework of recording of quantum queries [Zha18, Theorem 4.1] to obtain exactly the same result.
Finally, we present another result by Zhandry [Zha12] that states that the following Lemma 3. Let F Y X be the set of functions from X to Y and let W Y X (2q) be a set of 2q-wise independent functions from X to Y . For any quantum query algorithm A O makingueries to O, we have
We can construct sets W Y X (2q) such that it is possible to generate f $ ← − W 2q , compute f and compute f −1 in time O(q log(|Y |)). Take for example for W 2q random polynomials of degree 2q − 1. More discussion on this can be found in [Unr15] .
Identification schemes and signature schemes
Throughout the paper, x $ ← − S means that x is chosen uniformly at random from S. We put some quantum preliminaries on the quantum random oracle and quantum lower bounds in Appendix 2.
Identification schemes
An identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ), consists of the following:
• A key generation algorithm Keygen(1 λ ) → (pk, sk).
• The prover's algorithm P = (P 1 , P 2 ) for constructing his messages. We have
where x corresponds to the first message and St is some internal state. P 2 (sk, x, c, St) → z where c ∈ S ch is the challenge from the verifier and z the prover's response (second message).
• A verification function V (pk, x, c, z) used by the verifier that outputs a bit, 0 corresponds to 'Reject' and 1 to 'Accept'.
We do not specify here the different string lengths of x and z to not make notations too heavy. We explicit the challenge space S ch as it will often appear in our definitions and statements. We want all the different algorithms presented above to be efficient and we will usually omit their running times (i.e. fix them to 1), again to significantly reduce the amount of notations we introduce. Even though we deal with concrete security parameters in this paper, we kept the notation Keygen(1 λ ) with a unary representation of a security parameter to remind this implicit efficiency requirement. We present below more precisely the different steps of an identification scheme.
Identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P = (P 1 , P 2 ), V, S ch )
Initialization. (pk, sk) ← Keygen(1 λ ). The prover has (pk, sk) and the verifier pk. Interaction.
1. P generates (x, St) ← P 1 (sk) and sends x to the verifier.
2. The verifier sends a uniformly random c ∈ S Ch .
3. P generates z ← P 2 (sk, x, c, St) and sends z to the verifier.
Verification. The verifier accepts iff. V (x, c, z) = 1.
The first property we want from an identification scheme is that the verifier accepts if a prover runs the scheme honestly.
Definition 1 (Completeness). An identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) has perfect completeness if
The second property we want is honest-verifier zero-knowledge, meaning that an honest verifier cannot extract any information (in particular about the secret key sk), from its interaction with an honest prover.
Definition 2 (HVZK). An identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) is ε-HVZK if there exists an efficient simulator S such that the 2 distributions:
have statistical distance at most ε.
Finally, the third property that we require is soundness. We don't want a cheating prover that doesn't know the secret key sk to make the verifier accept.
Different flavors of soundness
There are different notions of soundness and the interplay between them will play an important role in our proofs. We put directly the running time of the attacker t in those definitions instead of just putting a polynomially bounded prover. This type of definition is better suited when dealing with concrete security bounds.
We first define the notions of soundness advantage and special-soundness advantage for a cheating adversary A . Definition 3. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme. For any quantum algorithm (a quantum cheating prover) A = (A 1 , A 2 ), we define
Remark: Special soundness corresponds usually to the existence of an efficient extractor E such that E(pk, x, c, z, c , z ) produces a valid secret key sk from a pair of accepting transcripts (x, c, z) and (x, c , z). In the context of identification schemes, it is always coupled with the hardness of generating a valid secret key. If such an extractor E exists then our quantity QADV sp IS (A ) is upper bounded by the probability of outputting a valid secret key. Therefore, these 2 notions of special soundness play the same role and are essentially equivalent.
From these definitions, we can define the notion of advantage related to respectively computational soundness, statistical soundness and special soundness.
Definition 4. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme. We define
When we talk about soundness, we will actually talk about the advantage related to those different notions of soundness. Next, we define a new hybrid notion of advantage between computational and statistical soundness: computational-statistical-soundness. Here we want the prover to be bounded in the first message but unbounded in the second message.
Definition 5. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme. We define
The relationship between those different notions is the following, for all t QADV IS (t) ≤ QADV cs IS (t) ≤ QADV st IS . Finally, we define the notion of strict soundness which says that for the second message, there is at most one valid message z that the verifier will accept. Definition 6. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme. We say that IS has strict soundness iff.
∀x, ∀c, |{z : V (x, c, z) = 1}| ≤ 1.
Soundness vs. special soundness
The reason why we have to deal with special soundness is that in many cases, we can construct identification schemes for which the special soundness can be directly reduced to a computationally hard problem. However, when we want to use identification schemes for instance for signature schemes, we require them to have computational soundness. Therefore, we need to find ways to relate them. In the classical setting, we can actually interpret the use of the forking lemma [PS96] as a way to relate the soundness and the special soundness of the underlying protocols. In the quantum setting, we often seem to require powerful theorems such as a quantum forking lemma or quantum rewinding, which are known to be hard problems. In the context of Fiat-Shamir constructions of signature schemes, many of these problems can be seen as a way to relate the soundness and the special soundness of identification schemes (or more generally Σ-protocols).
We present here the relation we will use between those soundness notions in the quantum setting.
Proposition 1. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme with strict soundness. For any t,
Depending on the context (short challenge size, not perfect strict soundness, ...) there can be different relations which will be better, see [Unr12, CSST11, CL17]. We'll prove this proposition in Appendix A
The Fiat-Shamir transform for identification schemes
The Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] is a major cryptographic construction that converts any Σprotocol into an non-interactive protocol. The idea is use a function H, modeled as a random function, and to replace the verifier's challenge c ∈ S ch by the string H(x) where x is the prover's first message. Since the prover can compute H(x) himself, there is no need for interaction anymore. For any identification scheme IS, we denote by FS H [IS] its Fiat-Shamir transform.
Running FS H [IS] for an identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) Initialization. (pk, sk) ← Keygen(1 λ ). The prover has (pk, sk) and the verifier pk. One-way communication. P generates (x, St) ← P 1 (sk), computes c = H(x) and generates z ← P 2 (sk, x, c, St). He sends the pair (x, z) to the verifier.
The Fiat-Shamir transform is very useful as it can be used (among other things) to construct signature schemes from identification schemes. As for identification schemes, we can define soundness properties. Here we will only present computational soundness.
Definition 7. Let IS = (Keygen, P, V, S ch ) be an identification scheme and FS H [IS] its Fiat-Shamir transform. Let A O H be a query algorithm. We define
This advantage notion will be directly related to the security of the associated signature scheme.
Commit and open identification schemes
A commit-and-open identification scheme is a specific kind of identification schemes where, for the first message, P commits to some values y 1 , . . . , y n and after the verifier's challenge, he reveals a subset of those values. More precisely, a commit-and-open identification scheme IS(Keygen, P, G, V , S ch ) consists of the following
1} m that will act as a commitment scheme.
• P 1 (sk) → (x, St) has to output x = (G(y 1 ), . . . , G(y n )) for some values y i and St = y 1 , . . . , y n .
• The challenge c corresponds to a subset I c of {1, . . . , n}.
Here, we explicit 3 parameters l, m, n: each y i ∈ {0, 1} l , each x i = G(y i ) ∈ {0, 1} m and the prover commits to n values. Notice that in the above verification function, we require V to be independent of x, this captures the fact that x is only used as a commitment and will rule out some unwanted cases. All the real life identification schemes we will consider have this property.
Commit-and-open Identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P, G, V , S ch )
1. P generates (G(y 1 ), . . . , G(y n ), y 1 , . . . , y n ) ← P 1 (sk) and sends x 1 , . . . , x n = G(y 1 ), . . . , G(y n ) to the verifier.
2. The verifier sends a random c ∈ S Ch that corresponds to a subset I c ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
3. P sends z = y Ic to the verifier.
In Appendix B, we show how to transform any identification scheme into a commit-and-open one. This transformation is very inefficient so we will not use it in our proofs but just wanted to point this possibility in case of interest.
Signature schemes
A signature scheme S consists of 3 algorithms (S.keygen, S.sign, S.verify):
• S.keygen(1 λ ) → (pk, sk) is the generation of the public key pk and the secret key sk from the security parameter λ.
• S.sign(m, pk, sk) → σ m : generates the signature σ m of a message m from m, pk, sk.
• S.verify(m, σ, pk) → {0, 1} verifies that σ is a valid signature of m using m, σ, pk. The output 1 corresponds to a valid signature.
Correctness.
A signature scheme is correct iff. when we sample (pk, sk) ← S.keygen(1 λ ), we have for each m S.verify(m, S.sign(m, pk, sk), pk) = 1.
Security definitions
We consider the standard EUF-CMA security for signature schemes. To define the advantage of an adversary A , we consider the following interaction with a challenger:
Initialize. The challenger generates (pk, sk) ← S.keygen(1 λ ) and sends pk to A . Query phase. A can perform sign queries by sending each time a message m to the challenger who generates σ = S.sign(m, pk, sk) and sends σ to A . Let m 1 , . . . , m q S the (not necessarily distinct) queries made by A . The adversary can also make q H queries to H. Output. A outputs a pair (m * , σ * ). The advantage Adv(A ) for A is the quantity
where m * = m 1 , . . . , m q S means ∀i, m * = m i .
Definition 8. Let S = (S.keygen, S.sign, S.verify) be a signature scheme. We define
where we maximize over an adversary running in time t, performing q H hash queries and q S sign queries.
We can directly construct a signature scheme from an identification scheme via the Fiat-Shamir transform. From an identification scheme IS = (Keygen, P = (P 1 , P 2 ), V, S ch ), we define the following signature scheme S IS = (S IS .keygen, S IS .sign, S IS .verify) that uses a random function H:
Proposition 2. [KLS18]
Let IS be an identification scheme which is ε-HVZK and has α bits of min-entropy. Let S IS the corresponding signature scheme. We have
The min-entropy here is the min-entropy of the prover's first message when he in honest. All schemes we consider will have very large min-entropy so the q S 2 −α will be negligibly small. Notice that in [KLS18] , they prove a more general result where the identification scheme IS allows some aborts. The above proposition shows that we only need to focus on the soundness of the Fiat-Shamir transform in order to build signature schemes, which is what we will do in the next section.
The Fiat-Shamir reduction for commit-and-open identification schemes
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem 
The above theorem proves the quantum security (or more precisely the soundness against quantum attacks) of the Fiat-Shamir transform for commit-and-open identification schemes. Notice also that the reduction we present here is non-tight. While some amount of non-tightness seems necessary here, we suspect that there are steps which can be improved to make the theorem tighter.
If we want to replace the random function Γ with a random function G with small range r, we can use the following Lemma Lemma 4. Let IS Γ = (Keygen, P, Γ, V , S ch ) be a commit-and-open identification scheme where Γ is modeled as a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l . Let IS G the same identification where Γ is replaced by G which is modeled as a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l with small range r. We have
Notice that above, we introduced a new notation. QADV FS H [IS Γ ] (t, q C , q H ) maximizes over all adversaries that run in time t, perform q C queries to O Γ and q H queries to O H . We will use this notation throughout the section. Sometimes, we will only specify one number of queries. What it refers to should always be clear from context. For example, on the right hand side of the above, the 2n in QADV sp IS Γ (2t + 2O(l(q 2 C + nq C )), 2n)) corresponds to O Γ queries, since there is no H in IS Γ .
We first present in high level the different steps of the proof and then prove each of those steps. 0. We start from a commit-and-open identification scheme IS Γ = (Keygen, P, Γ, V , S ch ) where Γ is a modeled as a random function Γ from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l .
1. Notice that because Γ is injective with overwhelming probability, IS Γ has strict soundness. Using Proposition 1, we have
2. Next, we prove that IS Γ actually has computational-statistical-soundness.
3. Then, we can prove that the Fiat-Shamir transform of IS Γ (actually of any identification scheme with computational-statistical-soundness) has quantum soundness.
4. Finally, we use the small range lower bound again to go back to IS G and prove Lemma 4.
Chaining all the inequalities from (3) to (1), we obtain our theorem:
or if we add from a function G with small range r (plugging in Lemma 4)
Proving Theorem 1
Here, we will prove Equations 2,3,4 which will prove the theorem.
Proposition 3 (Equation 2
). Let IS Γ = (Keygen, P, Γ, V , S ch ) be a commit-and-open identification scheme where Γ is modeled as a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l . We have
For each y = y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ {0, 1} ln , we define q y = 1 S ch |{c ∈ S ch : V (c, y Ic ) = 1}. where I c is the challenge set associated to c. Notice that p x 1 ,...,xn ≤ q Γ −1 (x 1 ),...,Γ −1 (xn) and that this holds for any injective Γ since V is independent of Γ. We first show the following lemma Lemma 5. For any quantum algorithm B running in time t, we have E (pk,sk)←Keygen(1 λ ) y←B(pk) [q y ] ≤ QADV IS Γ (t + n, n).
Proof. Fix a quantum algorithm B running in time t. We construct the following quantum algo-
• B O Γ 1 (pk) : y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ← B(pk). return (x, St) = ((Γ(y 1 ), . . . , Γ(y n )), (y 1 , . . . , y n )).
• B O Γ 2 (pk, x, c, St) : return z = y Ic where I c is the challenge set associated to c.
With the way we constructed B , the commitment constraints x i = Γ(y i ) for i ∈ I c are always verified hence
since B has running time t + n (recall we count the running time of Γ as 1), this concludes the proof of our lemma.
We can now finish the proof of Proposition 3. We consider the adversary A O but we replace calls to Γ with calls to Γ where Γ is taken from a family of 2q C -wise functions from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l . By Lemma 3, we can take for example random polynomials of degree 2q C and a q C quantum query algorithm will output indistinguishable outcomes i.e. and output y(x) = ( Γ −1 (x 1 ), . . . , Γ −1 (x n )). Because Γ is injective with overwhelming probability, for any x, p x = q y(x) . From there, we conclude
where in the last inequality, we use that the running time of B is t + O(l(q 2 C + nq C )). Indeed, we have to replace q C calls to O Γ with calls to O Γ which takes time O(l(q 2 C )) and invert Γ n times which takes time O(l(nq C )).
Proposition 4 (Equation 3
). Let IS be any identification scheme. We have
Proof. Let IS be an identification scheme and let A H a quantum algorithm that makesueries to H and runs in total time t. Let also
Let ε = QADV cs IS (t). By definition, we have that A H can find an element in U kε with probability at most 1 k for any k > 0, or else we would have QADV cs IS (t) > ε. Let κ a parameter that will be fixed later. We have:
Finally, we prove the lemma that allows to replace the random function Γ with a random function G with small range.
Lemma 6 (Lemma 4 restated, Equation 4). Let IS Γ = (Keygen, P, Γ, V , S ch ) be a commit-andopen identification scheme where Γ is modeled as a random function acting on {0, 1} l . Let IS G the same identification where Γ is replaced by G which is modeled as a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} l with small range r. We have
Proof. Let A O G ,O H a quantum query algorithm that makes q C queries to O G and q H queries to O H . We consider the following algorithm Z O G ,O H : 
Now, we consider the algorithm Z O Γ ,O H where each (quantum or classical) call to G is replaced by a call to Γ which gives
Notice that Z O G ,O H perform at most q C + n calls to G: q C when running A O G ,O H and at most n when running the checks (∀i ∈ I c , G(y i ) = x i ). From there, we can use Lemma 1 to have
Practical analysis
In this section, we will do a practical analysis of identification schemes which are a parallel repetition of commit-and-open identification schemes with challenge size 3. MQDSS,Picnic/Fish and the Stern signature are all based on an identification scheme which satisfies this property so the theorem below applies to these schemes. Theorem 1 already proves their security but is highly non tight. We show here that by tailoring our previous techniques to this specific case, we get much tighter bounds than those of Theorem 1 and also much tighter than what is proven in [DFMS19] and [LZ19] .
Theorem 2. Let IS G = (Keygen, P, G, V , {0, 1, 2}) be a commit-and-open identification scheme where G is modeled as a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 2l . Let IS ⊗k G be its parallel repetition k times. We have
Proof. Let
The proof goes informally as follows: consider an adversary A O G ,O H that runs in time t and performs respectively q G queries to G and q H queries to H. A wants to output (x, z) such that V (x, H(x), z) = 1. We can write x = (x 1 0 , x 1 1 , x 1 2 , . . . , x k 0 , x k 1 , x k 2 ) and we distinguish 2 cases:
We will show from here how to construct an adversary that breaks the soundness of IS.
2. ∀j, (x j 0 , x j 1 , x j 2 ) / ∈ S G pk . We show that this breaks the one-wayness of H.
We define
This first lemma will deal with the first case.
Lemma 7.
Pr (pk,sk)←Keygen(1 λ ) (x,z)←A (pk)
Proof. Proving this proposition is the purpose of Section 6.
This next lemma will deal with the second case.
Lemma 8.
Pr
(pk,sk)←Keygen(1 λ ) (x,z)←A (pk)
Proof. Let x = (x 1 0 , x 1 1 , x 1 2 , . . . , x k 0 , x k 1 , x k 2 ) / ∈ U G pk and for each j, x j = (x j 0 , x j 1 , x j 2 ). ∀j we have that x j / ∈ S G pk so letc j such that ∀z j , V (x j ,c j , z j ) = 0. Now fix a string c = c 1 , . . . , c k ∈ {0, 1, 2} k . If ∃j, c j = c j then for all z, V (x, c, z) = 0. From there, let V x,pk = {c : ∃z, V (pk, x, c, z) = 1}. From the previous discussion, we have |V x,pk | ≤ 2 k . Using Lemma 2, we can conclude that Pr (pk,sk)←Keygen ( 
We can now put everything together. We have
where we use respectively Lemma 7 and Lemma 8.
We want to point that the term O(q 2 H (2/3) k ) is necessary (up to some k factors) and correctly identifies an attack on FS H [IS ⊗k G ]. Indeed, suppose there is an adversary for IS such that for any pair of challenges (c * 1 , c * 2 ), it can produce x so that it successfully answers these challenges with O(1) queries. This is definitely not rules out but soundness and is actually true for the Stern 
Proving Lemma 7
In order to prove our lemma, we will need to dive in Zhandry's formulation of the QROM.
The Quantum Random Oracle Model, reminder
The Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is a model where we model a certain function with a random function H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m . Since we are in the quantum setting, we have a black box access to H but also to the unitary O H (|x |y ) = |x |H(x) + y . Notation: When we write a state of n qubits in the Hadamard basis, we will write |b H which will correspond to the state 1 √ 2 n y (−1) b·y |y .
Zhandry's oracles
One difficulty when dealing with the QROM is to deal with inherent randomness in the choice of H. In [Zha18] , Zhandry proposed another way at looking at a QROM, where the choice of H is encoded in a quantum register D (for database) which is a purification of the working register. This framework is quite elaborate and we present here some of the ideas and a small subset of the results presented in [Zha18] . We sometimes will go a little fast and we refer to [Zha18] for more details and explanations. It is good for now to think of D as an internal register of the oracle function. This approach allows us to work on a single quantum state instead of dealing with a random choice of H.
The standard oracle. The internal database of the oracle is initialized at
which stores in a uniform superposition over all functions H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m of all the input/output pairs (x, H(x)). If |D 0 is measured in the computational basis, we obtain the full specification of a random function H. The registers that contain the x are called the input registers and those that contain H(x) the output (or image) registers. We say that x (resp. y) is in the input (resp. output) registers is there exists an input (resp. output) register that contains x (resp. f (x)). How do we query O H in this framework? By applying the unitary O St : |x X |y Y |H D → |x X |y + H(x) Y |H D where X, Y are the input registers to the oracle and D is its internal quantum register containing the description of H. Notice that this unitary only uses D as a classical control so even is it can entangle (X, Y) and D, measuring D in the computational basis will still yield a uniformly chosen H ∈ F n m . Using O St with an internal register D is actually equivalent from an adversary's point to view to applying O H for a randomly chosen H.
At any point, we say that (x, y) is in the database if when measuring the whole register D in the computational basis, we get an element x, H(x) = y.
It seems that this is just a rewriting technique and that not much has been done. However, having access to this extra register D allows us to control the different possibilities of H after some queries done by an algorithm. It is shown in [Zha18] how to use this to (re)prove tight lower bounds for the both the search and the collision problem for random functions.
The compressed standard oracle. One problem with the standard oracle described above is that the database register D is of exponential size so we cannot efficiently manipulate it and hence cannot emulate efficiently the whole QRO. The idea will be to store a compressed version of this database. To see how, notice that |D 0 = x |x |0 H . We now define some quantum that will allow us to define the compressed oracle.
Fix an integer t. Let X = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) be an ordered tuple of different values in {0, 1} n and let R = (r 1 , . . . , r t ) be a tuple of values in {0, 1} m each different from 0. We define the state |ψ S X,R on register D as:
where y(x) = r i if x = x i and y(x) = 0 otherwise. This state corresponds to the standard database where we associate to each x i the value r i in the Hadamard basis and associate the uniform distribution i.e. the value 0 in the Hadamard basis to other values. Zhandry showed that after t queries, the database register is in span{|ψ S X,R } X,R where the set is over all the X, R defined above of size at most t. We also define the state |φ C X,R (q) as:
with the convention that {q + 1, . . . , q} = ∅. This state corresponds to the compressed database after t queries we associate to each x i the value r i in the Hadamard basis. q here is the total number of queries. Since these states are of size at most q, they can be stored and manipulated efficiently.
There is a (not necessarily efficient) isometry E that goes from |ψ S X,R to |ψ C X,R (q) so this compression is lossless. The idea of the compressed database is to store states |ψ C X,R (q) instead of |(ψ S X,R ) . Let D C the register in which the |ψ C X,R (q) lie. The compressed oracle is the unitary
Proposition 5 ([Zha18]). Consider any quantum algorithm A O . We have
In order words, applying O C is indistinguishable to applying O S .
We can emulate A O C efficiently by keeping track of the compressed database register D C . Zhandry showed a procedure that achieves this in time O(q) where q is the total number of queries to O C .
Main technical lemma
The above proposition shows that the working registers of an algorithm using the standard oracle or the compressed oracle are indistinguishable. An interesting feature is to be able to recover information about H from D C efficiently. Lemma 5 of [Zha18] shows that if an algorithm A O C outputs (x, y) st. H(x) = y then it can retrieve efficiently (x, y) in D C with very high probability (while it always appears in D).
Here, we extend this lemma when to the case where the algorithm outputs a value y but without knowing a preimage x. We fix here n = l and m = 3l for some integer l so we consider the functions 
Run an algorithm
For any triplet y = (y 0 , y 1 , y 2 ), we have
Proof. Fix a value triplet y = ( y 0 , y 1 , y 2 ) where each y i ∈ {0, 1} 3l and let p = p y and p = p y . Consider the first scenario and let |Φ 1 be the state in XYZD conditioned on the algorithm outputting y. We can write We write: where |A and |B are respectively the first and second (unnormalized) pure state of the above sum. y ∈ Y X = (y 1 , . . . , y t ) means that there exists i, j, k, st. y 0 = y i , y 1 = y j and y 2 = y k and that (x i , x j , x k ) ∈ Z y . We also use the convention 0 i=1 r i · y i = 0. |A and |B can be written as projections of |Φ 1 so |A ≤ 1 and |B ≤ 1. Let us define Π y the projection on the output registers containing y 0 , y 1 and y 2 . We have p = Π y |Φ 1 2 and we have Π y |A = |A . Now look at |B . The only way to get y in the output register is to have y 0 , y 1 or y 2 it in the elements |0 H . For each y i and each |0 H , this happens with probability ≤ 1 2 3l and there are at most 2 l such elements and 3 possible y i . By a union bound we have Π y |B 2 ≤ 3·2 l 2 3l .
Now consider the second scenario and let |Φ 2 be the state in XYZD C conditioned on the algorithm outputting y. We can write 
where for X = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) and Y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ), |η C X,Y = i∈{1,...,t} |x i |y i j∈{t+1,q} |⊥ |0 . We now write
The probability p to see a good y in the compressed database outputs is Π y |A 2 = |A 2 = |A 2 . From there we can conclude
This gives immediately
Remark: This lemma and proof are quite similar to Lemma 5 proven in [Zha18] . However in their case, the algorithm also outputs a preimage of y whereas we don't have this possibility so it complicates slightly the analysis.
Proof of Lemma 7
Definition 9. Consider an algorithm A O S acting on registers X, Y, Z where X, Y are query registers and Z is an extra register. Let also D the internal database register of O S . Let
where D x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 is the database register D of the oracle O S measured in the computational basis, conditioned on the output x 0 , x 1 ,
Definition 10. Consider an algorithm A O C acting on registers X, Y, Z, D C where X, Y are query registers and Z is an extra working register and D c is the compressed register. Let
where D C x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 is the database register D C measured in the computational basis, conditioned on the output x 0 , x 1 ,
Proof. Fix an algorithm A O St that outputs some values x 0 , x 1 , x 2 . We can apply directly Lemma 9 by taking y = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) and Z y = {(z 0 , z 1 , z 2 ) : V 012 (pk, z 0 , z 1 , z 2 ) = 1} to get the desired result. 
But notice that ADV 2 (B O C ) can be related to QADV IS . Indeed, an algorithm that can outputz 0 , z 1 , z 2 such that V 012 (pk, z 0 , z 1 , z 2 ) = 1 can break the identification scheme. Since
) which allows us to conclude.
Compressing the commitments
Theorems 1 and 2 show the security of the Fiat-Shamir transform but the resulting non-interactive scheme (hence the resulting signature scheme) still requires a random permutation as a hash function. Signature schemes based on commit-and-open identification already have a quite high signature length (i.e.communication cost) and using a random function from {0, 1} l to {0, 1} 3l can significantly increase the signature length.
In Lemma 4, we showed how to replace this random function by a random function with small range but this doesn't reduce the commitment size since this range is unknown. To overcome this problem, we use random sponges which will allow to reduce the commitment size. We present here only an informal discussion.
We only consider sponge functions with the same number of input and output bits. We can see a sponge function as 2 functions, an absorb and a squeeze function (S abs , S sq ) such that S abs : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} r+c and S sq : {0, 1} r+c → {0, 1} l where l is the number of input/output bits, r is the rate and c is the capacity of the sponge. The whole sponge function S will then be S = S sq • S abs (this includes eventual padding operations) where f is underlying function of.
In [CHS19] , it is shown that random sponges are indistinguishable from random functions.
Proposition 7. For any quantum query algorithm A O , we have
where Sp is the set of random sponges (for a randomly chosen internal function). This shows that we require a bit more than 2 c/3 queries to distinguish both settings.
We now show how to modify the above Fiat-Shamired identification schemes to reduce the commitment costs. With this transformation, each commitment has size c + r which can be made small. For example, we can take c = 400, r = 64 (to not have a too big number of rounds) and from the above proposition, we would have more than 128 bits of quantum security, for reasonable values of l.
Wrapping up and conclusion
In this paper, we showed techniques for proving the quantum security of the Fiat-Shamir transform, completing the new generic results of [DFMS19, LZ19] . Theorem 1 applies to commit-and-open identification schemes with a very strong commitment schemes. It has a theoretical appeal as it uses different techniques and doesn't require reprogramming of the quantum oracle.
From a practical perspective, Picnic, Stern and the non-optimized variant of MQDSS are signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir transform of identification schemes which are the parallel repetition of commit-and-open identification schemes with challenge size 3. Their security directly follows from our Theorem 2 and Proposition 2 and was not previously explicitly stated. We showed in particular how to deal with triple special soundness without losing tightness.
More generally, for any such scheme which uses some kind of commitment scheme, we can first require very strong properties for those schemes and then replace them by efficient quantum sponges, using their quantum security [CHS19] .
The above construction is very reminiscent of the Unruh transform [Unr15] . We show very informally that IS cao retains completeness, soundness and the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the original scheme IS. Completeness follows easily from the completeness of IS. Soundness holds because G is injective with overwhelming probability (so the commitment is perfectly binding) and by taking l large enough, the verifier cannot distinguish the first message from random elements in {0, 1} 3l so the honest-verifier zero-knowledge is preserved.
